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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant James Ciferni, a union employee subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”), asserted Pennsylvania common law claims for wrongful discharge 
and refusal to rehire in retaliation for claiming workers‟ compensation.  The District 
Court dismissed the action on the ground that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“LMRA”), preempted Ciferni‟s state law claims and, under that 
federal provision, his complaint was untimely.  For the reasons explained below, we 
affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of those claims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Appellee Day & Zimmerman
1
 is an industrial defense contractor, providing 
maintenance, labor, and construction services to the power industry.  Among other things, 
it supplies power stations with temporary and seasonal workers during planned 
maintenance and repair outages.  D&Z staffs these positions with workers from local 
unions pursuant to various CBAs.  One such agreement is the National Power Generation 
Maintenance Agreement (“NPGMA”), a multi-employer CBA with the International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, AFL-
                                            
1
 “Day & Zimmerman” refers to affiliated entities Day & Zimmerman, Inc., The Day & 
Zimmerman Group, Inc., Day & Zimmerman NPS, Inc., and Day & Zimmerman 
Management Services, Inc. (collectively “D&Z”).  
3 
CIO (“Boilermakers”).  At all relevant times, Ciferni, a common arc welder, was a 
member of the Boilermakers and subject to the NPGMA. 
 In April 2010, D&Z hired Ciferni to staff a power station during an outage.  After 
suffering a back injury during his first shift, Ciferni filed a claim for workers‟ 
compensation in May 2010; this claim was resolved by agreement of the parties in May 
2011.
2
  When D&Z refused to re-hire Ciferni in January 2011 and again in February 
2011, however, he filed grievances through the local Boilermakers‟ representative, 
claiming wrongful retaliation and failure to rehire because of his April 2010 workers‟ 
compensation claim.  D&Z responded that its decision not to re-hire was based on 
Ciferni‟s failure to report immediately his April 2010 workplace injury, a violation of the 
terms of the NPGMA.  Both of Ciferni‟s grievances were finally resolved against him in 
August 2011 through the NPGMA‟s grievance process. 
 Ciferni filed this lawsuit in April 2012 in Pennsylvania court.  D&Z removed the 
action to the District Court on the ground that Ciferni‟s claims were preempted by § 301 
of the LMRA, and then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.  
Ciferni responded by asking the District Court to remand his suit to state court; he argued 
that it was within the exclusive purview of Pennsylvania state courts whether a public 
policy exception should be created to permit union workers to pursue common law 
wrongful termination and retaliation claims.  In May 2012, the District Court issued an 
order (i) denying Ciferni‟s motion to remand, based on its conclusion that his claims were 
                                            
2
 Ciferni filed his claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workers‟ Compensation Act, 77 Pa. 
Stat. § 1 et seq. 
4 
completely preempted by the LMRA, and (ii) granting D&Z‟s motion to dismiss on the 
ground that Ciferni‟s complaint was untimely under § 301, which requires an employee 
to file a claim within six months after exhausting his contractual remedies under the 
CBA.
3
  Ciferni timely appealed the District Court‟s denial of his motion to remand, 
claiming that his complaint does not arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 because his state law claims are not completely preempted under § 301 of 
the LMRA. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court purported to exercise original jurisdiction over Ciferni‟s claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  We have jurisdiction over the 
District Court‟s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review of a motion to dismiss.  Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. 
Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  In doing so, “[w]e „accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we affirm the 
order of dismissal only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to 
relief.‟”  Id. (quoting Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 
2008)). 
                                            
3
 It is uncontested that, when Ciferni filed his complaint in April 2012, more than six 
months had lapsed from the time that any of his three underlying grievances were 
resolved.  See J.A. at 23 (workers‟ compensation claim resolved May 2011), 104–05 
(wrongful retaliation and failure to rehire claims resolved August 2011). 
5 
 Similarly, our review of the denial of a motion to remand is plenary “to the extent 
that the underlying basis is a legal question.”  Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 
53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 2002)).  The issue of whether a 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question.  Tellado v. IndyMac 
Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City 
Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 District Courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action “arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Removal of an 
action brought in state court to federal district court is permitted in any civil action in 
which the district courts have “original jurisdiction.”  Id. § 1441(a).  Where a state law 
cause of action is completely preempted by a federal statute, the suit is deemed within the 
original jurisdiction of the district court and subject to removal.  See AVCO Corp. v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1968). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Preemption Under § 301 of the LMRA 
 Ordinarily, the well-pleaded complaint rule prevents an action from being 
removed to federal court where federal jurisdiction is not presented on the face of the 
complaint.  Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 21 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).  The exception to this 
rule is the doctrine of complete preemption, which applies to claims arising in areas in 
which “the preemptive force of federal law is so „powerful as to displace entirely any 
state cause of action.‟”  Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
6 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).  “„[A]ny civil complaint raising this select group of claims 
is necessarily federal in character,‟” and thus completely preempted by the applicable 
federal statute.  Pascack Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare, 388 F.3d 393, 
399 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1987); 
citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). 
 “Section 301 of the LMRA is one such instance of complete preemption; it 
displaces entirely „any state cause of action „for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization.‟”  Berda, 881 F.2d at 22 n.1 (quoting Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 at 23).  This is so because the LMRA, which restricts the activities and power of 
labor unions, provides for federal court jurisdiction to enforce CBAs. 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as 
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be 
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to 
the citizenship of the parties. 
LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
 “On its face, this statute provides for federal jurisdiction over controversies 
involving collective bargaining agreements.  However, the Supreme Court has concluded 
that section 301 also expresses a congressional intent that the federal courts develop a 
federal common law to be applied in suits for enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements.”  Berda, 881 F.2d at 22 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 451 (1957)).  “When a suit stating a claim under section 301 is brought, state 
7 
contract law is displaced, and the collective agreement is interpreted under this federal 
common law.”  Id. (citing Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)). 
 The preemptive scope of § 301 is not limited to suits alleging a violation of the 
applicable CBA.  Rather, “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent 
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, 
that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal 
labor-contract law.”  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 However, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a 
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301.”  Id. at 211.  In 
particular, § 301 does not preempt state law claims if they exist independently of a CBA 
and if their resolution does not depend on analysis of the agreement.  For instance, in 
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406 (1988), the Supreme 
Court held that a union employee‟s Illinois claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a 
workers‟ compensation claim was not preempted by § 301 because the tort had been 
recognized as an independent state law remedy and did not require interpretation of the 
labor agreement.  Id. at 405–07.  Thus, whether Ciferni‟s claims are preempted by the 
LMRA depends on Pennsylvania‟s recognition of state law remedies for union employees 
and their capacity for resolution independent of the CBA.
4
 
                                            
4
 We reject Ciferni‟s contention that federal court resolution of his claims is improper 
because “judicial public policy arises only from litigation in state courts on the merits of 
the claims.”  Ciferni Br. at 7.  “While the nature of the state tort is a matter of state law, 
the question whether the [state] tort is sufficiently independent of federal contract 
8 
B. Wrongful Termination and Retaliation Claims under Pennsylvania Law 
 In Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974), Pennsylvania first 
recognized a narrow public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in 
holding that at-will employees may maintain tort suits for wrongful discharge when their 
terminations violate a “clear mandate of public policy.”  Id. at 184–85.  This exception 
was applied in the context of terminating an at-will employee in retaliation for filing a 
workers‟ compensation claim in Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1232 (Pa. 1998). 
 Pennsylvania courts consistently have held, however, that those common law 
wrongful discharge suits cannot be brought by union employees subject to a CBA.  The 
first case to consider this issue was Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 503 A.2d 36 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986), which held that the exception established by Geary did not apply to 
union employees.  Id. at 38.  In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that such an 
extension would be inconsistent with the exception‟s purpose “to provide a remedy for 
employees with no other recourse against wrongful discharge.”  Id. at 37.  The Court 
made clear that the public policy exception was not intended to vindicate public policy in 
all circumstances, but only where its violation would otherwise go without a remedy, 
explaining: 
 The Supreme Court‟s decision in Geary was clearly concerned with 
the protection of corporate personnel in the areas of employment not 
covered by labor agreements . . . .  The Court‟s purpose was to provide a 
remedy for employees with no other recourse against wrongful discharge.  
 Appellant and all like-situated employees are not without recourse 
when faced with indiscriminate discharge even when the discharge violates 
                                                                                                                                            
interpretation to avoid pre-emption is, of course, a question of federal law.”  Allis-
Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213–14. 
9 
public policy.  The collective bargaining agreement in the instant case 
provides protection against suspension or discharge without “proper cause.”  
Surely, in pursuing a grievance under the provisions of the agreement, if 
appellant can show that his discharge was in retaliation for his filing a 
workmen‟s compensation claim, he will have proved that his discharge was 
not for “proper cause.”  It would appear, therefore, that appellant will then 
be entitled to the remedies provided in the agreement. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Thus, according to Phillips, union employees have no need for the protection 
provided by the public policy exception because their public policy interests may be 
vindicated through the grievance process, by which they may challenge the basis for the 
allegedly wrongful employment action and, if successful, obtain any bargained-for 
remedies.  This proposition has been followed uniformly by Pennsylvania courts, e.g., 
Cairns v. SEPTA, 538 A.2d 659, 660–61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); Ross v. Montour R.R. 
Co., 516 A.2d 29, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), as well as by federal courts interpreting 
Pennsylvania law, e.g., Slater v. Susquehanna Cnty., 613 F. Supp. 2d 653, 669 (M.D. Pa. 
2009); Harper v. Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 153 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
5
 
 In this context, union-represented employees who wish to contest a termination or 
hiring decision as without proper cause must do so through the grievance procedure 
outlined in their CBAs and may not assert independent causes of action under 
Pennsylvania law, as the protection provided by the CBA negates any need for allowing 
                                            
5
 We have similarly recognized in non-precedential opinions that CBA-covered 
employees do not have state law causes of action in Pennsylvania for wrongful 
termination.  See Coppola v. JNESO-Pocono Med. Ctr., 400 F. App‟x 683, 684–85 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Raczkowski v. Empire Kosher Poultry, 185 F. App‟x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We merely note this historical fact, as by tradition we do not cite not precedential 
opinions as an authoritative basis for a decision. 
10 
an independent state law claim in the interest of public policy.
6
  Accordingly, Ciferni had 
no independent Pennsylvania cause of action for wrongful discharge or retaliation for 
filing a workers‟ compensation claim. 
*   *   *   *   * 
 For the forgoing reasons, we hold Ciferni‟s Pennsylvania common law claims for 
wrongful discharge and retaliation are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.  
Thus the District Court correctly denied his motion to remand to state court.  Because 
Ciferni failed to file this action within six months of when he exhausted his 
administrative remedies under the CBA, his complaint was properly dismissed as 
untimely under § 301. 
                                            
6
 Refusal-to-hire claims are arguably distinguishable from wrongful discharge claims, as 
CBAs generally contain express prohibitions on terminating without cause but do not 
necessarily include parallel protections with respect to hiring.  Nonetheless we are 
satisfied Ciferni was protected adequately from retaliatory hiring decisions by the CBA 
grievance process such that the public policy exception is not implicated.  Because 
resolution of his state-law retaliation claim is “substantially dependent on analysis of 
[the] collective bargaining agreement,” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 
(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), it also is preempted by § 301. 
